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14ASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
appendix than a citizen; rather, they present a compromise between
those who would allow all terminations and those who would permit
none.
WRONGFUL DEATH OF A MINOR CHILD: THE
CHANGING PARENTAL INJURY
In Washington, an action may be brought by a parent for the
wrongful death of a child along either1 of two statutory avenues.2 The
general wrongful death statute creates a right of action in the dece-
dent's personal representative for the benefit of parents who may be
dependent upon the deceased for support.' Under the so-called "child-
' Election of remedies problems created by the overlapping statutes are treated
briefly in Comment, Damages in ,Vashington Wrongful Death Actions, 35 WASH.
L. REv. 441, 443 (1960).
-\vVAsHi. REv. CODE §§4.20.010, .020 (1965) and WASH. REv. CODE §4.24.010
(1965).
Under early Anglo Saxon law the "wergild" system of monetary awards allowed
recovery by parties affected by the death of another: his King, lord, and next of
kin. The system functioned primarily however in a punitive fashion and disappeared
with the development of criminal process. (See 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 52 (1895). This qualification aside, there was at common law no
action for wrongful death. Hedrick v. Ilwaco R. & Nav. Co., 4 Wash. 400, 30 P. 714(1892). Recovery is therefore exclusively by statute in all jurisdictions except, per-
haps, Hawaii.
"Wrongful death" and "survival" statutes enacted in various jurisdictions differ
with respect both to parties entitled to maintain the action and measure of damage.
"Survival" statutes preserve the cause of action the deceased himself could have
maintained had he lived. See WASH. REv. CODE § 4.20.060 (1965) for Washington's
survival statute. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.010, .020 provide for "true" wrongful death
recovery. Patterned basically after Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act, 9 &
10 Vict. c. 93 (1846)), these provisions do not merely prevent termination of the
decedent's claim; they create an action for "wrongful death" in named statutory
beneficiaries. Although some jurisdictions allow recovery by the decedent's estate for
its losses, Washington has no such "estate" statute.
In Washington, the general wrongful death statute provides:
WASH. REv. CODE § 4.20.010-Right of Action. When the death of a person is
caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another his personal represen-
tative may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the
death; and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances
as amount, in law, to a felony.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.020-Beneficiaries of Action. Every such action shall
be for the benefit of the wife, husband, child or children or the person whose
death shall have been so caused. If there be no wife or husband or child or
children, such action may be maintained for the benefit of the parents, sisters,
or minor brothers, who may be dependent upon the deceased person for support,
and who are resident within the United States at the time of his death.
In every such action the jury may give such damages as, under all circum-
stances of the case, may to them seem just.
"Dependent" has been construed to mean "substantial," though not total, de-
pendence. See note 37 infra.
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death" statute,4 an action may be maintained directly by a parent. No
requirement of dependency obtains where the deceased was a minor.
Because the child-death statute contained, until recently amended, 5 no
measure of damages provision, courts might arguably have instructed
juries to assess damages under the child-death statute in accord with
the general statute's "just... under all the circumstances" provision.6
However, the supreme court developed a more restrictive measure:
"the value of services lost, less the cost of support and maintenance. '
7
Lost services were evaluated on a "pecuniary loss" standard.8
Honest application of a pecuniary standard does not, in today's
'Prior to amendment, WAsH. REv. CODE: §4.24.010 (1965), creating a right of
action for injury or death of a child, provided:
A father, or in case of his death or desertion of his family, the mother may
maintain an action as plaintiff for the injury or death of a minor child, or a
child on whom either is dependent for support, and the mother for the injury
or death of an illegitimate minor child, or an illegitimate child on whom she
is dependent for support.
The text of the statute, as amended, is reprinted in note 17 infra.
Ch. 81, Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1967. As an initial proposition the problem
should have been one appropriate for legislative concern. In Skeels v. Davidson,
18 Wn. 2d 358, 367, 139 P.2d 301, 305 (1943), the court expressed its dissatisfaction
with the provision:
There is, perhaps, no other phase of the law of damages which is in so unsatis-
factory a state as that concerned with the rule governing damages for the wrong-
ful death of a child, under a statute such as our own which creates the right of
action, but prescribes no measure of recovery.
'See note 3 supra. At least one early case indicates that the court recognized a
"fair and just" measure for determining damages under the child-death statute as
well as under the general provision. Kranzusch v. Trustee Co., 93 Wash. 629, 634,
161 P. 492 (1916). Mr. John J. Kennett, in his address before Washington
NACCA's 1964 Seminar, suggests that the two statutes are in pari iateria
and that the general statute's "damages as seem just" guidelines should have con-
trolled in application of the child-death statute as well. Proceedings, NACCA bf
Washington Seminar, Pre-trial Discovery, Procedures and Problems-Elements of
Damage-Wrongful Death Actions, Abatement Survival and Revival of Actions
in Washington 194, 206 (Feb. 1964).7 Hedrik v. Ilwaco R. & Nay. Co., 4 Wash. 400, 30 P. 714 (1892) apparently is the
leading case.
' Statutes in several jurisdictions, though not in Washington, insert the word
"pecuniary" before the word "injury." (See note 9 infra.) In Washington, early
case law development apparently assumed that a restrictive "pecuniary" standard
was implied. There is no apparent reason why "services" should not include acts
of kindness and affection around the house and the more tangible nursing and
baby-sitting functions. See Spokane P. & S.1. Co. v. Cole, 54 F.2d 318 (9th
Cir. 1931). Nevertheless, courts generally equated the "value of services" with lost
earnings and pecuniary contribution. Hedrick v. Ilwaco R. & N. Co., 4 Wash. 400,
30 P. 714 (1892), did not mention a "pecuniary" basis for evaluating services,
but two years later Atrops v. Costello, 8 Wash. 149, 35 P. 620 (1894) assumed such
a standard and first employed the term. Perhaps the problem was due largely to a
confusion between "compensatory damages" and the conceptually more narrow "pe-
cuniary damages." Apparently the courts assumed that any damages other than
pecuniary losses sustained were "punitive." See, e.g., Skidmore v. Seattle, 138
Wash. 340, 343, 244 P. 545, 547 (1926):
We, of course, must recognize that the father cannot recover more than his
actual pecuniary loss, since the doctrine of punitive damages has been repud-
iated by this court in its repeated decisions.
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world, allow adequate recovery for child-death." The cost-accounting
technique for measuring damages-value of services less cost of sup-
port-is archaic in a society which is not structured on child labor
and the family chore framework of an agricultural community. The
careless driver today usually does the parent of a deceased minor an
economic favor."°
Without the aid of legislation defining elements of recovery, the
judiciary have long allowed substantial recoveries in practical deroga-
tion of the archaic pecuniary loss standard. In Washington, as in
most jurisdictions, recognition of the inadequacy of a pecuniary stan-
dard was early reflected in relaxed proof requirements." It has long
been unnecessary to introduce specific evidence of pecuniary loss.
12
The jury has been allowed to consider the age, health and capacity of
the child and the situation of the parent in order to form an estimate
of pecuniary loss." By assuming that wrongful death statutes con-
template recovery of substantial damages by parents of a deceased
minor, the courts justified relaxed evidence requirements as necessary
to avoid frustration of legislative intent.'
In jurisdictions required by statute to assess damages for "pecuniary injury"
only, (see e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A. 2922 (1948)), strained constructions are
required to allow recovery for loss of companionship. These jurisdictions have not
abandoned the "pecuniary" standard, but have found companionship to be a pe-
cuniary loss, arguing that a monetary or market value can be placed on society and
acts of kindness. See, e.g., Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960),
for a unique attempt to approach directly the problem of setting a "pecuniary"
value on a child's life as part of a functioning family unit. The value of a machine
to a manufacturing plant is the cost of replacement (or fair market value) plus
the value of profits lost for a period of its discontinued operation. The cost of
replacement of a child, like the cost of raising a bull or other organic asset to a
given age, is the value of inputs: food, clothing, shelter, training. The value of
profits lost is the net of services and companionship less cost of continued support.
Hence, under this view, the value of a child is the sum of cost of replacement
(food, clothing, training) and lost return on this investment (net value of services,
if a positive sum, and companionship).
1 The archaic pecuniary or cost-accounting standard is also inconsistant with
developments in other areas of wrongful death recovery, where the law has better
kept pace with a changing society. Courts now allow compensation to husbands for
loss of love, affection, society, services, and consortium of deceased spouses; minor
children recover for loss of the mother's care, love, protection, services and gui-
dance. Kramer v. Portland-Seattle etc., 43 \Vn. 2d 386, 261 P.2d 692 (1953). See
also Walker v. McNeill, 17 Wash. 582, 50 P. 518 (1897) (husband and father);
Davis v. North Coast Transp. Co., 160 Wash. 576, 295 P. 921 (1931) ; Pearson v.
Picht, 184 Wash. 607, 552 P.2d 314 (1935) (husband).
1 There is in many jurisdictions, though not in 'Washington, a presumption
that parents sustain a pecuniary loss. See Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485 at 514-515
(1950).
"2-See, e.g., Atrops v. Costello, 8 Wash. 149, 154, 35 P. 620, 621 (1894).
" Sweeten v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 88 Wash. 679, 153 P. 1054 (1915).
"*See Lockhart v. Besel, 71 Wash. Dec. 2d 109, 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967);
Sweeten v. Pacific Power & Light Co.. 88 Wash. 679, 153 P. 1054 (1915) ; Atkeson
v. Jackson Estate, 72 Wash. 233, 241, 130 P. 102 (1913).
[ VOL. 43 : 639
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
That substantial recoveries can no longer be justified on a fictional, 5
value of services minus cost of support standard has been recently
recognized in Washington by both legislative and judicial action. Judi-
cial remedy came first with the decision in Lockhart v. Besel' which
redefined the measure of damages to include loss of the child's com-
panionship but restricted the award to the child's remaining years of
minority and excluded recovery for parental anguish. Loss of services
was retained as an element of damages under Lockhart, but the case
did not clearly decide whether a specific showing of economic loss
would subsequently be required.
Legislative response to the problem came within a week of the
Lockhart decision. To the statutory section creating the cause of ac-
tion was added a separate damages provision allowing damages for
medical expenses, loss of services, loss of love and companionship of
the child, and injury to or destruction of the parent-child relation-
ship.'7 The amended child-death statute does not on its face require
the Lockhart result: recovery for companionship but not for parental
anguish or post-majority losses. No case has yet been decided under
the terms of the new provision. Clark v. Icicle Irrigation Dist.,"8
"Skeels v. Davidson, 18 Wn. 2d 358, 139 P.2d 301 (1943) must be the classic
case exposing the obvious hypocrisy in awarding more than nominal damages on
the basis of any value of services less cost of support formulation. An award of
$1,000 over funeral expenses was allowed even though the child, aged 6Y2, was re-
tarded to the extent that a private physician's care had been required for over two
years.
"
0Lockhart v. Besel, 71 Wash. Dec. 2d 109, 426 P.2d 605 (1967). Defendant
motorist, attempting to pass on a curve, struck the deceased, a 17-year-old high
school senior, in the latter's lane of travel. Plaintiff brought action for the wrongful
death of his son pursuant to WASH. REv. CODE § 4.24.010, the so-called child-death
statute. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Plaintiff's motion
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, increasing the amount of the award to
reflect compensation for loss of the child's companionship, or alternatively, for a new
trial, was denied. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court, en banc and without
dissent, reversed and remanded. Held: The measure of damages in a wrongful
death suit brought under WASH. REv. CODE § 4.24.010 should be extended to include,
in addition the pecuniary value of the child's services, loss of companionship of a
minor during his minority but without any consideration for grief or mental
anguish of the parents.
"Ch. 81, Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1967. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.24.010, as amended,
provides:
A father, or in case of his death or desertion of his family, the mother may
maintain an action as plaintiff for the injury or death of a minor child, or a child
on whom either is dependent for support, and the mother for the injury or
death of an illegitimate minor child, or an illegitimate child on whom she is
dependent for support.
In such an action, in addition to damages for medical, hospital, medication
expenses, and loss of services and support, damages may be recovered for the
loss of love and companionship of the child and for injury to or destruction"
of the parent-child relationship in such amount as, under all the circumstances of
the case, may be just.
72 Wash. Dec. 2d 202, 432 P.2d 541 (1967).
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decided subsequent to the legislative and judicial developments, per-
haps indicates that the court will treat the amendment as embodying
only the Lockhart changes, although the significance of the decision on
this issue is unclear.1" Appeal was from a judgment entered prior to
the amendment's passage, and while the possibility of retroactive ap-
plication might have been suggested in Clark, the argument was not
before the court. -'
'9 Id. at 210 n.8, 432 P.2d at 546 n.8 (1967) the court suggested, in dictum:
By coincidence this court and the legislature were engaged in opening the
same door at the same time. Six days after the opinion in the Lockhart case
was filed, the Governor signed the bill which added the ... (damages provision)
to R.C.W. 4.24.010 (Emphasis added).
The court did not have to face the issue of whether the amended statute expanded on
the companionship extension of damages allowed under Lockhart v. Besel, 72 Wash.
Dec. 2d 109, 426 P.2(1 605 (1967).
"Provisions added by amendment and relating to substantive rights, in accor-(lance with the general rule applicable to original enactments, are generally pre-
sumed to operate prospectively, absent a clear showing of contrary legislative in-
tent. Bodine v. Dept. of Labor & Indus., 29 Wn. 2d 879, 190 P.2d 89 (1948) requires
"the most clear and unequivocal expression" of contrary intent, although apparently
the requisite intent may be implied from the language of the amendment or cir-
cumstances surrounding its enactment. 1 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TIOx, 435 (3d. ed., Horack) (1943); Layton v. Home Indem. Co., 9 Wn. 2d 25,
113 P.2d 538 (1941). However, amendatory acts which can fairly be said to
affect only procedural rights are generally given retroactive application. 1 J.
SUTHERLAND, supra at 436.
The distinction is frequently drawn not in terms of "procedural" or "substantive"
legislation, but in terms of acts which are "remedial" and those which are not.
Cautious application of the proposition that "remedial statutes" will be given
retroactive effect is required, since courts often refer to statutes as "remedial"
without further characterization. In a very general sense, a "remedial" enactment
is one which alleviates hardships in the common law. Hence, the Washington
wrongful death statute has been termed "remedial" in application of the general
maxim of statutory construction calling for liberal construction of enactments
"remedial in nature." Cook v. Rafferty, 200 Wash. 234, 240, 93 P.2d 376, 379 (1939).
The term is frequently used to describe statutes affecting only procedural and not
substantive rights. 3 J. SUTHERLAND, supra, at 74. It is in this context-remedy
as procedure-that a statute must appear "remedial" to be exempted from the general
rule requiring prospective application. See Nelson v. Dept. of Labor & Indus.,
9 Wn. 2d 621, 115 P.2d 1014 (1941) (Washington workman's compensation law);
Tellier v. Edwards, 56 Wn. 2d 652, 354 P.2d 925 (1960) (Washington non-resident
substitute service statute) ; Henry v. McKay, 164 Wash. 526, 3 P.2d 145, (1931)
(Amendatory provision requiring payment of interest for delinquency in payment
of taxes given retrospective application because interest is not made part of the
tax-the statute relates to the mode of compelling or hastening payment only.);
United States v. Mashburn, 85 F. Supp. 968, (W. D. Ark. 1949) (Amendment to
Housing and Rent Act allowing the government to maintain a suit for treble
damages for overcharges in rentals as well as for injunctive relief where the tenant
as individual does not institute the treble damages action. The court remarked
that prospective application is required "especially ... when such retroactive opera-
tion would create a new liability or affect an existing liability to the disadvantage
or detriment of a defendant." Id. at 969.)
Consequently the court's denomination of the Washington wrongful death statute
as "remedial in nature" ( Cook z,. Rafferty., supro) is not determinative of the prospec-
tive-retroactive issue. Although the court adverted to the amendment's passage in
Clark v. Icicle Irrigation Dist., 72 Wash. Dec. 2d 202, 432 P.2d 541 (1967), the sta-
tute's new provision apparently was not argued, and the court's parenthetical mention
[ Vol.. 43 :639
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Four major problem areas result from the interraction of the Lock-
hart and Clark cases with the amended statute:
(1) Will the court now require a specific showing of net pecuniary
injury when recovery is sought for lost services?
(2) Where recovery is for loss of the continued benefits of a minor
child's services and companionship, are damages to be limited by the
decedent's remaining years of minority as required by Lockhart?
(3) Given lost companionship as the basis of recovery under both
Lockhart and the damages provision added by amendment, does the
statute's cause of action section, requiring economic dependence upon
an adult child-decedent, still make sense?
(4) Does the statutory provision allow recovery for parental an-
guish or is recovery limited to the more narrow Lockhart companion-
ship standard?
Loss OF SERVICES
Lockhart recognized that loss of companionship is the real basis for
allowing substantial recoveries, but did not clearly decide how loss of
services, retained as an element of damages under the subsequent
amendment,21 would be treated. It was to be predicted that, in dis-
carding the well-established legal fiction that value of services less cost
of support will always yield a positive sum, the court would sub-
sequently be more reluctant to allow recoveries based on loss of serv-
ices. The legislative intent formulation which aided recovery under
the services test 22 is satisfied so long as there is a substantial recovery
of the development (72 Wash. Dec. 2d at 210 n.8, 432 P.2d at 546 n.8) leaves its treat-
ment of the retroactivity matter unclear. It is clear, however, that courts generally,
given a statute's ambiguity, decide retroactivity issues in favor of prospective applica-
tion. Sce Bodine v. Dept. of Labor and Indus., 29 Wn. 2d 879, 190 P.2d (1948).
This strong presumption favoring prospective application should be controlling.
The terms "remedial," "procedural," and "substantive" are usually conclusory labels-
generic terms used more as a description of what a court has decided is the
proper thing to do than as analytical tools employed to make that decision. SeeKilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961), treating the
measure of damages for wrongful death as procedural or remedial for conflicts of
laws purposes, but recognizing that "... there is authority both ways." 172 N.E.2d
at 529. The New York court of appeals suggests, correctly, that the question is really
one of deciding how death action damages should be treated in view of a state's
iublic policy.M Sec note 17, supra.
-The court often justified the allowance of substantial recoveries, despite its use
of a value of services test, by arguing that the recoveries effectuated the legislative
intent that more than nominal damages be recovered. See text accompanying note
14 supra. That the court recognizes the substantial-recoveries-intended crutch is
no longer needed, given Lockhart's companionship allowance, see Clark v. Icicle
Irrigation Dist., 72 Wash.. Dec. 2d 202 at 210, 432 P.2d 541, at 546 (1967).
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upon any basis. The relaxed requirements for proof of actual loss
under the services less support formula" are no longer needed.
Therefore, it is not surprising that, in the most recent case follow-
ing Lockhart,2 ' the Washington court upheld a $15,000 verdict for
loss of companionship, but found excessive an additional $15,000
award for loss of services. Although the case was not brought under
the new statutory provisions, there is no reason to expect a different
result if the amendment is applied. There may be instances in which
a child's services and contributions are of net pecuniary value to the
parent, - ' but courts should now carefully examine assertions that such
losses did in fact accompany the child's death.
This result would seem reasonable. Intellectual honesty2 would be
served. More importantly, the result realistically pursues the funda-
mental objective of tort law-compensation for injuries sustained.
The remedy is changed to reflect the recognition of injury to a dif-
ferent interest. The result recognizes that the same tortious conduct
produces different injuries under varying conditions of society.
LossEs AFTER MAJORITY
Lockhart limits the award for lost services and companionship to
the child's remaining years of minority.2 7 No such artificial boundary
on compensation is suggested by the amended statute. The only re-
quirement concerning minority relates to the initial creation of the
cause of action, which precludes recovery by the parent for death of
an adult child upon whom he or she is not dependent. -5
'See text accompanying notes 13, 14 supra.
-1Clark v. Icicle Irrigation Dist., 72 Wash. Dec. 2d 202, 432 P.2d 541 (1967).
'See id. at 207, 432 P.2d at 544. The situation could be expected in:
1) "Shirley Temple" cases-the child prodigy whose extreme youth would pre-
sent a large cost of support set-off, but whose pre-majority earnings could reasonably
be anticipated to be large;
2) Cases where, because the child is close to majority, the set-off factor is small,
and the child in fact is working and contributing to the family's support. This
situation would be particularly probable in a large family, where the incremental
cost of maintaining one more child has a less significant effect on total overhead.
3) Agrarian family cases, where the child is old enough to perform significant
tasks as part of a functioning unit, and where he works not for wages but for his
"keep." It is probable that the cost to replace the child by a stranger under hire
performing the same tasks would exceed the incremental cost in providing the
child's "keep."
- Id.
Lockhart v. Besel, 71 Wash. Dec. 2d 109, 114, 426 P.2d 605, 609 (1967).
"Under WAsH. REv. CODE § 4.24.010 (1965), a parent can recover for death or
injury of a minor child "...or a child on whom either (parent) is dependent for
support." See note 17 supra, for text of amended statute. Discussion of the de-
pendency requirement is found in text 661-63 infra.
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The restriction of loss of services damages to the years of minority
is out of step with the majority of jurisdictions. 9 These jurisdictions
recognize that recovery "need not be based upon any legal right to
services, but only expectation."" ° No arbitrary cut-off point is fixed
for "lost services" damages. Under the new provision, "loss of serv-
ices and support" is retained as one element of economically measur-
able loss.3 ' In a complex society, where a minor child is not likely to
be a financial asset, loss of reasonably anticipated contributions after
majority should be compensable. Certainly parents of a college stu-
dent, to whose development and education countless hours and thou-
sands of dollars have been contributed, should be allowed to prove
the loss of any reasonably anticipated return intended by a grateful
son or daughter. 32
It is even less reasonable to cut off loss of companionship awards at
the age of majority. Such a loss is correctly described as continuing
over the full course of the parent-child mutual life.33 The measure
should be the parents life expectancy, not the child's remaining years
of minority. 4
DEATH OF AN ADULT CHILD
There is room for substantial improvement beyond the narrow prob-
lem of damage response to a minor's death. The parent of a deceased
C. MCCORMICK, DAMIAGES 353, 354 (1935); Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485, 506 (1950).
'V. PROSSER, TORTS 931 (1964).
" Ch. 81, Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1967. See note 17 supra.
"12In the few jurisdictions which do not allow recovery, the loss after majority is
considered too speculative since the child may have died or married or for other
reasons become "unable or unwilling" to support his parents throughout those
years. See Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485 at 489 (1950). Such damages can no more
appropriately be attacked as "speculative" than corresponding economic damages
awards allowed for the years of minority. This was especially true under former
Washington practice -where substantial recoveries were allowed for the death of
extremely young infants under the pre-Lockhart loss of services test. Nevertheless,
in jurisdictions which do allow such recovery, stiffer evidence requirements gen-
erally obtain where damages based on losses after majority are sought. See Annot.,
14 A.L.R.2d 485 at 506 n.2 (1950). But see Foerster v. Direito, 75 Cal. App. 2d
323, 170 P.2d 986 (1946), recognizing in California a rebuttable presumption that
a child's financial contributions to the parent and parent's enjoyment of child's
comfort, friendly association, and protection would have continued during the
parents' life expectancy.
" See Currie v. Fiting, 375 Mich. 440, 134 N.W.2d 611 (1965). Held: if award
is reduced to present value, it is no error to allow $1,000 per year for loss of society
and companionship over the life expectancy of the parents for death of their 21-
year-old daughter, a college student.
" This result assumes a shorter life expectancy of parent-beneficiary than child-
decedent. Since the appropriate measure is mutual life, a showing of existant
terminal disease in the child should require a different result.
1968]
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twenty-one-year-old seldom has even the initial cause of action be-
cause recovery under both wrongful death statutes35 and the survival
statute6 requires a showing of "substantial dependency ''1 7 upon an
adult child-decedent. The new damages provision, employing a loss of
companionship theory, is inconsistent with a cause of action section
employing an economic dependency test. In practical application, a
parent who is not "substantially dependent" at the exact time of death
does not recover."8 If it is unfair that the parent of a twenty-year-old
college student should receive damages for loss of only one year's
companionship, how much less equitable is it that the parents of a
twenty-one-year-old student who had previously arranged to live with
and support them have no cause of action at all?
While the court is not bound by express statutory language to fix
the measure of damages at majority where death of a minor child is
involved,3" the statutory restriction on its power to remedy the adult
child problem presents an obstacle to judicially initiated reform. The
child-death statute specifically requires that the decedent, except
where a minor, be a child on whom either parent "is" dependent for
support." The general41 and survival4 2 statutes allow recovery only
by parents who "may be" dependent upon a child over twenty-one at
the time of death.4 3 While a broad reading of the words "may be" as
''may at some time be" or "may become" is possible," 4 the "is" Ian-
' Under the general wrongful death statute, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.20.010, .020
(1965), recovery is conditioned upon a showing of dependence whether the child
was a minor or an adult. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1965), the child-death statute,
requires the parent's dependence on the deceased only when that child was an adult.
" WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1965). Unlike the child-death statute (see note
35 supra), the survival statute does not distinguish between minor and adult dece-
dents. Whether or not the child had attained majority before death, parent-plain-
tiff's dependence upon him must be shown.
17 See Cook v. Rafferty, 200 Wash. 234, 93 P.2d 376 (1939); Mitchell v. Rice,
183 Wash. 402, 48 P.2d 949 (1935); Estes v. Schulte, 146 Wash. 688, 264 P. 990
(1928); Grant v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 145 Wash. 31, 258 P. 842 (1927);
Kanton v. Kelly, 65 Wash. 614, 118 P. 890 (1911); Bortle v. Northern Pac. R.
Co., 60 Wash. 552, 111 P. 788 (1910).
'See Grant v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 145 Wash. 31, 258 P. 842 (1927)
(Dependency must be based on condition, not promise of deceased to contribute to
future support).
'See text accompanying note 28 supra.
40 WAsH. REv. CODE § 4.24.010 (1965). See note 35 supra.
" WASH. REv. CODE §§ 4.20.010, .020 (1965). See note 35 supra.
12 WASH. REv. CODE § 4.20.060 (1965). See note 36 supra.
' The result under these statutes, unlike the child-death provision, is the same in
the case of a minor child. See notes 35, 36 supra.
" In practice, such a construction would eliminate the hardships inherent in
requiring dependence at the exact moment of death. The result in terms of sound
tort theory would be recognition that present condition is not the sole indicia of
reasonable expectation.
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guage of the child-death statute would seem prohibitively inflexible.
Legislative action striking the dependency requirements altogether is
suggested. In the first place, it would not be necessary to perform
judicial gymnastics to effectuate a reasoned policy. Secondly, and
more importantly, the inconsistency in allowing substantial recovery
for non-pecuniary damages while basing the action on economic de-
pendence would be avoided.
PARENTAL GRIEF AND MENTAL ANGUISH
While recovery for after-majority losses is generally favored, com-
pensation for parental suffering has not been widely allowed. The
majority rule disallows recovery for mental anguish,4" but it is con-
pensable in at least eight states.46 Damages for grief and mental an-
guish of beneficiaries has been specifically permitted by statute in
some states,47 but similar recovery has been allowed under provisions
calling only for "fair and just" awards."8 While there is nothing in
either the general statute or the amended child-death provision which
specifically disallows such an award, 49 mental anguish of statutory
beneficiaries5° has not been recovered in any wrongful death action in
Washington.51 The court has not faced the issue under the amended
statute.2
"Annot., 14 A.L.P2d 485, 495 (1950).
Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vir-
ginia, and West Virginia. See notes 47, 48 infra.
'. Arkansas and Florida expressly provide for recovery of mental suffering damages
by statute. Aax. STAT. ANN. § 27-906-9 (repl. 1962) (See Peugh v. Oliger, 233
Ark. 281, 345 S.W.2d 610 (1961); Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F.
supp. 688 (W.D. Ark. 1959)). FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.03 (1964) (See Georgia S. &
Fla. R. Co. v. Perry, 326 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1964)).
'"Virginia: Gamble v. Hill, 208 Va. 171, 156 S.E.2d 888 (1967); Matthews
v. Hicks, 197 Va. 112, 87 S.E.2d 629 (1955); Wolfe v. Lockhart, 195 Va. 479, 78
S.E.2d 654 (1953); West Virginia: Black v. Peerless Elite Laundry Co., 113 W:
Va. 97, 169 S.E. 447 (1933); Louisiana: Thompson v. New Orleans Ry. & Light
Co., 148 La. 698, 87 So. 716 (1921); South Carolina: Gomillion v. Forsythe, 218
S.C. 211, 62 S.E.2d 297(1950); South Dakota: Simons v. Kidd, 73 S.D. 306, 42
N.V.2d 307 (1950); Kansas: Duran v. Mission Mortuary, 174 Kan. 565, 258 P.2d
241 (1953).
"For text of both statutes, see nbtes 6 (general wrongful death) and 17 (child-
death) supra.
'As opposed to the decedent's pain and suffering, which is allowed under the
survival statute (WASH. REv. CODE § 4.20.060 (1965)). See Orcutt v. Spokane County,
58 Wn. 2d 846, 364 P.2d 1102 (1961).
"The Washington court has held that the general wrongful death statute's "fair
and just" provisions do not support a mental anguish recovery. See Penoza v.
Northern Pac. R.R., 215 F. 200 (W.D. Wash. 1914); Walker v. McNeill, 17 Wash.
582, 50 P. 518 (1897). Instructions under both statutes (general and child-death)
uniformly disallow consideration of the mental element. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Besel,
71 Wash. Dec. 2d 109, 426 P.2d 605 (1967).
' See note 19 .rpra and accompanying text.
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The Washington court has not clearly declared why damages for
parental suffering may not be recovered. Rather, the restriction en-
joys the "assumed as given" status which, before Lockhart and the
amendment, protected the no-recovery-for-loss-of-companionship prin-
ciple. One case" ' indicates an early identification of mental anguish
recovery with exemplary damages. Recovery for parental anguish may
more reasonably be understood as compensation for injury which,
although mental, is real.
It is probably under an assumption that wrongful death statutes
undertook to create only a specific protected interest-the right to
"positive benefits" from the continued life of the minor-that courts
have continued to disallow recovery for the beneficiary's mental an-
guish, a type of "negative harm" assumed remaining in the legally
unprotected area still governed by common law no-recovery princi-
ples.5 4 It is not seriously doubted that wrongful death statutes pat-
terned after Lord Campbell's Act5' initially contemplated only re-
covery for loss of economic benefits "in the form of support, services
or contributions during the remainder of [the decedent's] lifetime if
he had not been killed." '  If this was the initial legislative intent,
allowance of recovery for loss of non-pecuniary benefits under the
"companionship" label indicates that intent no longer controls.
In other areas of tort law, it has long been recognized that mental
pain and suffering is a real injury. Mental and emotional peace is a
' Penoza v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 215 F. 200, (W..D. Wash. 1914). The court
noted that it found no case where grief and anguish were recovered except in
jurisdictions which allowed exemplary damages. Id. at 202. The same confusion
once supported the well-accepted rule denying loss of companionship recovery. See
note 8 supra.
" But see Wvycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118, 123 (1960) (cited with
approval in Clark v. Icicle Irrigation Dist., 72 Wash. Dec. 2d 202, 208, (1967) for
the Michigan court's definition of companionship and its realistic approach to loss of
services). The Michigan court complained that:
[We are.. .restricting the losses to pecuniary losses,...not the sorrow and
anguish caused by its death. This is not because these are not suffered and not
because they are unreal. The genius of the common law is capable, were it left
alone, of ascertaining such damages, but the legislative act creating the remedy
forbids.
The Michigan statute, Micii. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2922 (1948), specifically requires
"pecuniary injury" for recovery, a restriction not imposed by the express language
of the Washington statutes. The Michigan court found companionship loss a
"pecuniary" injury (see note 9 sutpra), but could not apparently allow the beneficiary's
mental anguish damages without openly abandoning the pecuniary standard.
' Fatal Accidents Act, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846). Lord Campbell's Act was the
English solution to the absence of remedy for wrongful death at common law.
"Pure"-i.e. not "survival" or "estate"-wrongful death statutes are patterned funda-
mentally after Lord Campbell's Act. See note 2 supra.
"' W. PROSSER, TORTS at 928 (3d ed. 1964).
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protected interest: injury to that interest alone may now subject the
transgressor to liability in tort.57 Whether or not a separate common
law cause of action arises for negligent infliction of emotional harm,5
its progress to "parasitic" status as an element of damages where an
independent basis for liability exists59 is well established. Where re-
covery is not allowed, objections often center around the speculative
nature of the injury and danger of "run-away verdicts."6 ° More valid
objections are to the possibility of fraud and the difficulty in defining
the scope of defendant's duty."' Recognition of a spectator's tort,
creating a cause of action in third party bystanders and remote rela-
tives, could subject the defendant to unlimited liability.6 2
These objections are not applicable to the statutory recovery for
wrongful death. Recovery is tied to an independent statutory cause of
action which creates rights only in certain named beneficiaries who
are members of the immediate family. Because remote parties cannot
recover, the likelihood of feigned emotional injury is greatly reduced.
See generally W. PROSSER, Torts 346-54 (3d ed. 1964).
"' The lav presently protects the mental interest to different degrees depending on
its manner of invasion. Intentional infliction of emotional harm generally creates
liability in tort, while negligent infliction of the same injury often does not.
Id. The question has arisen in the wrongful death context whether, on the theory
of negligent infliction of mental harm alone,. (i.e. without the statutory cause of
action), a remedy exists at common law. See Amaya v. Home Ice Fuel & Supply
Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513 (1963), holding that "contemporaneous bodily con-
tact" or an "independent cause of action" is required, absent negligence approaching
"wilfull, wanton" stature.
'The action is usually based on accompanying (e.g. "impact" cases) or resul-
tant (e.g. miscarriage cases) physical injury, but may be based on other independent
bases. W. PROSSER, TORTS 348 (3d ed. 1964). See note 58 supra.
' See generally W. PROSSER. Torts 349-354, 929-30 (3d ed. 1964). Juries every
day are trusted with similar "speculating" responsibilities; and in fact they were
required to make determinations no less speculative under the old "value of services
less cost of support" test. Evaluating mental anguish in disfigurement and inten-
tional infliction cases, where recovery is generally allowed, requires the same
"speculation." Measuring "physical" pain and suffering of the automobile accident
victim poses similar problems of valuation. (Where the decedent has suffered non-
physical injury, beneficiaries recover for his suffering under the Washington sur-
vival statute, WASH. REv. CODE § 4.20.060 (1965). See note 50 supra.) The problem
is thus apparently not one of the speculative evaluation of the extent of damage,
though lip-service is often given to this objection. Rather, it is one of initially
establishing the genuineness of the claim to injury at all. The examples above,
where recovery is allowed, have one common characteristic-a high reliability fac-
tor. See note 63 infra.
The danger of "run-away verdicts" should not seriously be considered. The
"remittitur" device and appellate review serve as the traditional check to this
problem. See Comment, Damages In Washington Wrongful Death Actions, 35
WASH. L. REv. 441, 452 (1960). The law should not be so timid as to refuse
recovery for injury because it questions the accuracy of the jury.
"See W. PROSSER, TORTS 352, 354 (3d ed. 1964).
_See generally id., at 352-4.
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Parental recovery for child-death presents a circumstantial guarantee
of trustworthiness: there is a high probability that substantial emo-
tional harm has resulted.63
If the barrier to recovery for mental distress is that the wrongful
death award is a statutory recovery, and that the statute creates a
protected interest only in the beneficiary's right to "positive benefits"
accruing from the minor's continued existence, then the statute too
narrowly defines the interest to be protected. It is not clear, however,
from the language of the recently added damage provision, 4 that
such a limitation is required by the statute.
The provision allows compensation for, in addition to the tradition-
ally recognized losses of services and support," "loss of love and com-
panionship and for injury to or destruction of the parent-child rela-
tionship .. . ." (Emphasis added.) 6 Implied is the thought that the
two-loss of companionship and destruction of the parent-child rela-
tionship-involve different injuries. Since "services and support" cov-
ers both prospective earnings and acts of kindness around the house-
hold, 7 and since "love and companionship" is a generic term for
positive, non-pecuniary benefits flowing from the child, s compensa-
tion for the "loss" of continued benefits flowing from child-decedent
to parent-beneficiary is provided without the aid of the "parent-child
relationship" addition. The section before the conjunction "and," in
short, encompasses all elements recovered through Lockhart in the
common law handling of damages in Washington. Moreover, recovery
is not for "loss" of the parent-child relationship, but for some type of
interest invaded when the "parent-child relationship" is injured or
destroyed. It would therefore seem that the section provides for re-
covery not for termination of receipt of "positive benefits" which
' The ease of recovery for feigned emotional injury is undoubtedly the primary
consideration underlying the present insistence on accompanying physical injury,
however slight, in other tort situations. W. PROSSER, TORTS 350 (3d ed. 1964).
Where the physical impact "rule-of-thumb" has been abandoned, it has been in cases
where there is a high probability that the claim of serious mental distress is
genuine. Id. at 349. Recognizing that child-death involves a similar high credibil-
ity factor, the jury in Gamble v. Hill 208 Va. 171, 156 S.E.2d 888, 894 (1967), was
allowed to infer "sorrow, suffering and mental anguish" of parents from the fact of
death, without direct proof of the injury.
Ch. 81, Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1967.
' See text supra discussing the services element.
' Ch. 81, Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1967. See note 17 supra.
,'Sec Spokane, P. & S. R.R. Co. v. Cole, 54 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1931).
' E.g., love, society, comfort, advice, and protection.
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would have continued in futuro, but for the infliction of a "negative
harm" or detriment unrelated to decedent's inability to confer benefits.
Parental mental suffering is the only element of damages which is both
not covered by the pre-conjunction provisions and responds to the type
of "negative" injury contemplated by the post-conjunction language.
A more direct approach to construction of the "parent-child rela-
tionship" language is possible. The concept of a protected "relational
interest" is not new.69 The interest is usually discussed in connection
with actions for alienation of spousal affections and for the kidnapping
or seduction of a child. Wrongful death situations involve injury to
the same interest.7° A parental cause of action for the abduction of a
child was originally based on loss of services. Today most courts re-
quire only a token showing of loss of services.71 With the cause of
action established, recovery for loss of companionship and the parent's
mental anguish is allowed. 72 Damages are allowed to compensate for
injuries to interests arising out of the existence of a parent-child
relationship and damaged by interference with-a temporary "destruc-
tion of" or "injury to"--that relationship. But they are harms to an
interest belonging peculiarly to the parent, in the sense that they exist
independent of any interruption of continued positive benefits occa-
sioned. They are the same "negative harms" suffered by the parent of
a child not abducted but dead.73
°See Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REv. 460 (1934); W. PROSSER,
TORTS 894-909 (3d. 1964).
"
0The connection is seldom recognized. But see Green, Relational Interests, 29
ILL. L. REv. 460, 469-73 (1934).
W' ,V. Prosser, TORTS 905 (3d ed. 1964).
Little v. Holmes, 181 N.C. 413, 107 S.E. 577 (1921). Dean Prosser views the
recovery in terms of "deprivation of the child's society" and "the wound to (the
parents's) feelings." W. PROSSER, TORTS 905 (3d ed. 1964).
Similarly, action for seduction of a daughter generally requires establishing a
technical loss of services, but courts recognize that invasion of the interest sub-jects the transgressor to liability for "loss of her society and comfort, and for(the parent's) wounded feelings." W. PROSSER, TORTS 906 (3d ed. 1964). And see
WASH. REv. CODE § 4.24.020 (1965) which allows recovery by parents for the seduc-
tion of a daughter even though "there be... no loss of service."
It may be objected that these are actions for intentional interference with the
relational interest. But the distinction is without significance where, with lia-
bility established (i.e. given that the interest is protected from negligent invasion
by the statute), the question is one of defining the characteristics of the interest.
This is a determination which can be made without reference to the particular
manner of its invasion.
It is furthermore recognized that under both approaches to dealing with the
language of the amendment, the assumption has been that the post-conjunction
language is not mere excess verbiage. It is apparent that the strongest objection
to this construction of the statute supposes that if the legislature intended to con-
tradict a long-standing common law rule barring mental anguish recovery, it would
have done so unambiguously. Cf. Weaver v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n, 59 Cal. 2d 428, 380 P.2d 644, n.6 (1963).
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Under either approach-direct or process of elimination-to con-
struction, support for parental anguish recovery can be found in the
language of the statute. Given the statute's ambiguity, the courts
should not needlessly restrict the statute's scope to create damnum
absque injuria-harm without redressible "injury."
Tort law seeks to compensate injuries as those injuries are under-
stood in light of changing social and economic conditions. In so far
as the development of tort law has seen the expansion of the body of
recognized, protected interests, conduct once immune now subjects
the actor to liability.7 4 Where conduct has long been subject to lia-
bility in tort, the type of injury it causes must be re-evaluated in
terms of different interests invaded as conditions change.
The wrongful death of a child once subjected a transgressor to no
liability at all. Statutes modeled on Lord Campbell's Act 75 and en-
acted in times when the child was an economic asset to the parent,
recognized a protected interest in the parent's right to the child's
labor and services. Notwithstanding this initial statutory intent, both
court and legislature have recognized that today the injury sustained
by a parent on the death of his child is not primarily economic. The
law recognizes an interest in emotional and mental well-being. If this
is the primary interest invaded when a parent loses his minor child,
tort law should look to that injury, and fashion an appropriate remedy.
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
The new amendment, coupled with instructions allowing the jury
to consider, along with those elements specifically enumerated in the
provision, parental grief and mental anguish and losses past majority
in assessing damages, could eliminate some of the inequities in re-
covery by parents for death of a minor child. Relevant matter 71
But it is just as likely that the legislature was less than crystal-clear because it
wanted the courts to continue the redefining process. It may have felt the courts to
be the appropriate agency for determining what is a "fair and just" response to an
injury to the relational interest as that interest acquires new characteristics in a
changing society. See generally Peck, The Role of the Courts arnd Legislatures in
the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINx. L. REV. 265 (1963), asserting the propriety of a
creative judicial role in continuous tort law reform.
" E.g., the intentional infliction of emotional harm: Christensen v. Swedish
Hosp., 59 Wn. 2d 545, 368 P.2d 897 (1962); Browning v. Slenderella System, 54
\Wn. 2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959); Gadbury v. Bleitz, 133 Wash. 134, 233 P. 299
(1925); Davis v. Tacoma R. & P. Co., 35 Wash. 203, 77 P. 209 (1904).
'5 Fatal Accidents Act, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846). See notes 2, 55 supra.
'The general rule is that the jury may consider the decedent's relation with
his parents and particularly his propensity to aid them, where loss of services and
support is sought. Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485, 522 (1950); 2 A.L.R.2d LATER CASE
SERVICE 148 (1965). See Dean v. Oregon R. & Nay. Co., 38 Wash. 565, 80 P. 842
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should be freely admitted, so as to allow proof of all reasonably sus-
tained losses. In affixing a value to a particular parent-child relation-
ship, the jury should be allowed to determine what compensation is
fair and just under all the circumstances.77
Should courts hold under the new amendment that parental pain
and suffering may not be considered, legislative action should be taken.
The damages provision could be amended in the direction of increased
generality to allow the jury to find "such damages as seem fair and
just," without specific enumeration of elements. 78  However, lack of
guidance would again be a problem.79 An alternative approach toward
increased specificity would be preferable. 80 Amendment of the child-
(1905). Judgment of substantial damages for loss of services and earnings during
minority of a son serving in the Army against parents' will was affirmed on appeal,
44 Wash. 564, 87 P. 824 (1906), on the basis of letters from son to parents and con-
versations indicating son's intent to return home and his probable contributions. See
also Comment, Damages in Washington Wrongful Death Actions, 35 WASH. L. Rv.
441 (1960), citing Clason v. Velguth, 168 Wash. 242, 11 P.2d 249 (1932); Walker v.
McNeill, 17 Wash. 582, 50 P. 488 (1897), Lund v. City of Seattle, 163 Wash. 254, 1
P.2d 301 (1931); Creamer v. Moran Bros. Co., 41 Wash. 636, 84 P. 592 (1906). An
examination of the nature of the relationship goes directly to establishing how
reasonable the expectation of benefits is in a particular case. The result is consistent
with allowing post-majority losses in minor-child death cases, because it recognizes
expectation, not right, as the basis of recovery. See note 30 and accompanying text
supra. A logical extension, then, would be elimination of the dependency requirement
in adult-child cases, where expectation, not present condition, should be the measure.
See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
In jurisdictions where loss of companionship is compensated, generally "the jury
may consider the degree of intimacy between the parent and the decedent." Annot.,
14 A.L.R.2d 485, 523 (1950). See Gardner v. Hobbs, 69 Idaho 288, 206 P.2d 539
(1949). The same evidentiary standards should apply to Washington's recently
recognized companionship recovery. The reasoning discussed above with respect
to "services" awards applies with equal force here.
' Established evidentiary policy correctly requires exclusion of testimony which
is clearly irrelevant or prejudicial. For example, while evidence of the "degree of
intimacy" between parent and child may be properly admitted to determine damages
for loss of companionship, (see note 76 supra), courts may be unwilling to hear
certain types of evidence offered to establish that fact. See, e.g., Gamble v. Hill,
208 Va. 171, 156 S.E.2d 888 (1967), where defendant sought to introduce evidence
of plaintiff's deceased minor daughter's bad character. While the fact of frequent
separation of the child from her parents may have tended to establish the value of
the relationship, the evidence of immoral character per se was properly considered
irrelevant on both companionship and mental anguish issues. The court also found
the closing argument of plaintiff's counsel "improper" as unsupported by evidence
(query whether also prejudicial), where counsel referred to the deceased, mother of
one illegitimate child at age 13 and again pregnant at the time of death three years
later, as "'sweet sixteen' and 'innocent of wrongdoing.'" See 156 S.E.2d at 895.
'Similar provisions are held in Virginia and West Virginia to allow mental
anguish of parent-beneficiaries. (See note 48 supra). One advantage would be that
no inference would be drawn from the concurrent inclusion of some specifically
enumerated items and omission of unambiguous language establishing parental suffer-
ing as an element of damage. Another advantage would be the obvious flexibility left
to the courts.
' See notes 5,6 supra.
' Even under the "increased generality" alternative suggested immediately above,
the absence of unambiguous language allowing mental anguish recovery could bottom
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death statute to spell out that parental suffering may be considered
and that majority is not a cut-off line for damage recovery would allow
more adequate awards. In addition, legislative action removing the
dependency requirement is needed. The recent amendment to the
child-death statute is a step in the direction of curing multiple ills in
the entire wrongful death situation-but only that.
REGULATION OF TREATY INDIAN FISHING
On December 26, 1854, the Treaty of Medicine Creek' was concluded
between the United States2 and nine western Washington Indian
tribes.3 The Indians ceded to the United States all rights in a large
portion of their tribal lands,4 but reserved the "right of taking fish, at
all usual and accustomed grounds and stations ... in common with all
citizens of the Territory."5 Whatever the representatives of the United
States or the Indian chiefs meant by this clause has been lost in anti-
quity. It is certain that they could not have foreseen the acrimony'
an inference that such recovery is not contemplated by the statute. While the gen-
eral provision for "fair and just" awards avoids implication from the concurrent
specific enumeration of some elements (see note 79 supra), it might still be sug-
gested that if the legislature intended to contradict a long-standing common law
rule it would have done so explicitly. (See note 73 supra.)
Moreover, it is not certain that the Washington court would reconsider its re-
strictive construction of what is contemplated by a "fair and just" award. (See
Penoza v. Northern Pac. R.R., 215 Fed. 200 (W.D. Wash. 1914), discussed note 51,
supra.)
'Treaty with Nisquallys, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132.
'Acting for the United States was Isaac I. Stevens, Governor of Washington
Territory.
'The Indian tribes signing the treaty were the Nisqually, Puyallup, Steilacoom,
Squak sin, S'iltomamish, Steh-chass, T'Peeksin, Squi-aitl, and Sa-heh-wamish.
'The Indians ceded approximately 2,240,000 acres and reserved reservations com-
prising 3840 acres. See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, AN UNcom, tO,"
CONTROVERSY 23 (1967). The Indians received from the government $35,750, or
about 1.6 cents per acre.
'Treaty with Nisquallys, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132, art. III.
'The Indians' claims to the right to fish free of state regulation have been
countered by the demands of commercial and sport fishermen that the Indians' fishing
be subjected to state regulation. See Hearings on S.J. Res. 170 and S.J. Res. 171
Before Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), especially app.,
at 211-29. The claims of the Indians have become something of a civil rights
cause celebre, with Dick Gregory and Marion Brando participating in "fish-ins"
protesting state regulation of treaty Indian fishing. See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE
COMMITTEE, AN UNcOMNIMON CONTROVERSY 109-13 (1967). The latter reference con-
tains an excellent, though not wholly unbiased, account of the entire controversy
over state regulation of treaty Indian off-reservation fishing. It concentrates pri-
marily on the Puyallup, Nisqually, and Muckelshoot tribes, and delves deeply into
the historical and sociological aspects of the controversy, while placing a lesser em-
phasis on the legal issues.
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